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ABSTRACT
Juveniles should hold the right to a jury trial under the U.S. Constitution,
but they do not. In most states, when a trial occurs, a single judge determines
whether a youth loses their liberty, and that imprisonment can last for years.
The United States Supreme Court has decided that the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury is irrelevant; prosecution in juvenile court is not a criminal prosecution
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment because the purpose of the juvenile
courts is a good one—to rehabilitate youth. The Court has also held that the
right to a jury trial is not required under the due process clause because juries
are not essential to factfinding. By exploring the unexamined meaning of
criminal prosecution in the Sixth Amendment, rejecting the Supreme Court’s use
of the state’s good purpose, and probing the neglected historical right to a jury
trial for juveniles, this Article challenges the common assumption that juveniles
do not hold the right to a jury trial.
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INTRODUCTION
Currently, juveniles accused of crimes in this country have fewer
constitutional rights than adults. Perhaps most significantly, in nearly all
juvenile proceedings where there is a trial, only one person—a judge—not a
jury—decides if the minor whom the state has accused of wrongdoing is guilty
of a crime.1 If the judge convicts, the child could be incarcerated for several
years.2 This conviction of a minor by a judge could result in a sentence that is
longer than the one served by an adult convicted of the same crime.3 Also, the
conviction by the judge could adversely contribute to the length of any future
incarcerations of the individual both as a child and as an adult.
In spite of these problems, there is no movement to change this entrenched
system. But constitutional reasons exist to do so. The Sixth Amendment, which
sets forth the right to a jury trial, states in part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a … trial, by an impartial jury.”4 The Supreme
Court has held that the Sixth Amendment, along with the Fourteenth
Amendment, guarantees the right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions under
state law.5 In deciding that criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial, the
Court has emphasized that the trial by jury is a right “fundamental to the
American scheme of justice.”6
Notwithstanding this sentiment, the Supreme Court has held that minors do
not hold the constitutional right to a jury trial during juvenile proceedings.7 In
other words, minors tried in juvenile courts for the same crimes as adults cannot
demand a jury trial under the U.S. Constitution like their adult counterparts.
Without significant analysis, the Court has reasoned in part that juvenile
proceedings are rehabilitative in nature and thus are not “criminal prosecutions”
within the Sixth Amendment.8 Many scholars have disagreed, arguing that any

1
The general caseload of the juvenile courts is hundreds of thousands of cases. See SARAH
HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS
2015 7 (2018).
2
This Article does not always adopt the preferred nomenclature for juvenile proceedings. For example,
instead of adjudicated delinquent, conviction may be used. Instead of detained, incarcerated may be used. As
explained in this Article, the preferred characterizations do not change the actual circumstances faced by
juveniles accused of committing crimes.
3
See RANDY HERTZ, MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 394–398 (2018).
4
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
5
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968).
6
See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
7
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
8
See id. at 539, 541.
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compelling distinctions between the juvenile system and the adult system do not
continue to exist; because the separate system for juveniles has strayed from its
original rehabilitative focus and towards a more punitive function similar to the
adult system, juveniles should possess the same right to a jury trial as adults.9
The debate over whether the juvenile system is rehabilitative is misplaced,
however, because, regardless of its current rehabilitative or penological purpose,
juveniles have a right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court has previously held that
the right to a jury trial is based on history.10 To determine whether a jury trial
right exists, the historical divisions of authority between judges and juries in
England and America at the time of the ratification of the Sixth Amendment are
examined.11 Under these systems, judges and juries balanced one another.12
Judges instructed the jury on the law, and juries decided facts. Judges—who
were selected by the king or royal governor—were not given fact-finding
authority because, for example, they could be corrupt or could disfavor certain
people whom the government had prosecuted.13
At the time of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, under these English
and American systems, adults and juveniles who were accused of crimes were
treated in the same manner.14 They possessed the right to a jury trial.15
Subsequent proposed English legislative reform to lessen or eliminate the right
to a jury trial for minors confirms that English juveniles possessed the right to a
jury trial, and later legislation in the states also fortifies that American minors
held the right to a jury trial at the founding.16 Moreover, specifically at the time
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, American juveniles held the right
to a jury trial.17

9
See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988); Martin
R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a PostMcKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Public Trials]; Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile
Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 129 (1987) [hereinafter
Observations]; Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503
(1984).
10
See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288–89 (1930).
11
Id.
12
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979)
(1769).
13
Id.
14
See discussion infra Section II.
15
See discussion infra Section II.
16
See infra Section II.B.1.c.
17
See discussion infra Section II B.2.
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Although the Supreme Court has exhibited some smattering of awareness of
juveniles’ historical right to a jury trial,18 it has denied the right to a jury trial
based on three concepts related to the rehabilitation of children. First, because
of states’ rehabilitative purposes in creating juvenile courts, it has concluded that
juvenile proceedings are not criminal prosecutions within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment, and therefore the right to a jury trial is irrelevant.19 This
conclusion has been reached without any analysis of the meaning of criminal
prosecution. Further, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the rehabilitative
purpose of the state in creating juvenile courts suggests that juvenile courts
cannot be criminal prosecutions if they are for purposes of rehabilitation. But,
as described in this Article, there is no support for denying or precluding the jury
trial right based on a state’s good purpose. The relevant issue is the meaning of
criminal prosecution. An examination of this meaning shows that juvenile
proceedings are in fact, criminal prosecutions.
Second, related to its conclusion that juvenile proceedings are not criminal
proceedings, at times the Court has cited parens patriae or the historical
authority of the state to take custody of children.20 In the past, however, the state
did not have the power to take custody of a child who was accused of a crime.
In England and in America, before the state could take custody, a jury would
need to convict a child of a crime in the same manner as a jury would convict an
adult of a crime.21
Finally, the Court has also rejected any right to a jury trial for juveniles based
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For several reasons
but particularly focused on the purported equal ability of judges to find facts, the
Court has stated the right to a jury trial is not required for fundamental fairness
to minors in juvenile proceedings.22 Again, history defies this conclusion. The
jury was integral to fairness for several reasons including, that through its
decisions, it could check the power of the judiciary, which could be subject to
corruption or bias. This is illustrated by the Kids for Cash scandal. In exchange
for bribes, two Pennsylvania judges improperly sent scores of children to a
private youth detention center.23 Although upon the discovery of this bribery
scheme, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed thousands of cases against
juveniles, the judges’ actions caused the scarring detention of many children for
18
19
20
21
22
23

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
Id. at 16–17.
See infra notes 72–99 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Section II.B.1.c.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
KIDS FOR CASH (Senart Films 2013).
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significant periods of time—including for years.24 More recently, judicial
corruption or bias is shown by what has been described as a “pay-to-play
system.” Judges have been accused of improperly appointing juvenile clients to
lawyers who made significant contributions to the judges’ campaigns.
Apparently, these lawyers have benefitted greatly from the appointments—some
receiving over $500,000 a year from the state for the representation of these
juveniles.25
Although, as this Article will demonstrate, juveniles possessed the historical
right to a jury trial, many will say that history is irrelevant today and claim that
the jury trial is inefficient and in the context of juveniles, inhibitive of
rehabilitation. These statements have missed the value that the jury can play that
may exceed any efficiency gains from judicial trials. Additionally, no evidence
has been presented to show that the trial of juveniles by jury would hamper the
rehabilitation of youth. Most importantly, the historical division of authority
between judges and juries that provided motivation for the establishment of the
constitutional right to a jury trial has been ignored.
Several issues derive from the unconstitutional shift of decision-making to
judges in juvenile courts. Because judges do not reflect the overall diversity of
the juvenile population, their singular decision-making at minimum may give
the appearance of being unfair.26 And their determinations may actually be
unfair. For example, reports show that black youth have been disproportionately
confined; blacks were more likely to be detained than whites who were similarly
situated and blacks who comprise only a small fraction of the population
constituted around 40% of those in confinement, while whites were only
33.8%.27 After a child is adjudicated guilty by a judge, other consequences for
the minor can follow. For instance, black children received worse sentences and
were sent to inferior facilities—more blacks to public facilities and whites to
residential ones.28 And whether involving bias, corruption or otherwise, the
24
Id.; see Jon Schuppe, Pennsylvania Seeks to Close the Books on “Kids for Cash” Scandal, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 12, 2015, 4:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pennsylvania-seeks-close-books-kidscash-scandal-n408666.
25
Neena Satija, Harris County Juvenile Judges and Private Attorneys Accused of Cronyism: “Everybody
Wins but the Kids,” TEX. TRIB. & REVEAL (Nov. 1, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/11/01/
harris-county-texas-juvenile-judges-private-attorneys/ (Rodney Ellis, a former senator in the Texas Senate said:
“That is just an inherent conflict of interest. It’s sleazy, it’s old school, and it should have changed a long time
ago.”).
26
See CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, MONIQUE CHASE & EMMA GREENMAN, BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUSTICE,
IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 49 app. D (2010).
27
See Barry C. Feld, Punishing Kids in Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 47 CRIME & JUST. 417, 422, 424,
426 (2018).
28
See id. at 426.
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problem of wrongful convictions that exists in the adult courts also can be found
in juvenile courts.29
This Article is the first to fully explore whether juveniles have been
improperly denied a constitutional right to a jury trial.30 It takes a particularly
unique view by exploring the meaning of criminal prosecutions, discussing the
propriety of the use of purpose in constitutional analysis, and analyzing the
historical right to a jury trial for juveniles. Part I first describes the juvenile court
system in the United States and elsewhere and explains why juvenile courts were
established. It then explores the rights that the Supreme Court has held juveniles
possess in these proceedings. These include many rights, including proof beyond
a reasonable doubt but do not include the right to a jury trial. Subsequent
decisions of state supreme courts, including a recent case where a juvenile was
accused of murder, have explored the proper reach of the holding denying the
right to a jury trial.31 States have also recognized the significance of the lack of
the right to a jury trial and imposed other protections for juveniles. Part II argues
that juveniles hold the right to a jury trial. It shows that juvenile proceedings are
indeed criminal prosecutions under the meaning of the Sixth Amendment—
eliminating the argument that the Amendment is irrelevant to juvenile
proceedings. It also describes how the Court has inappropriately justified its
denial of the right to a jury trial to juveniles based on the good purpose of states
to rehabilitate juveniles. This Part then examines juvenile rights in the English
and American courts at the time of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. It
illustrates that juveniles were afforded the unequivocal right to a jury trial in
these courts in the late eighteenth century. Juveniles in the United States

29
See Laura Nirider, Megan Crane and Steven Drizin, Gerald Gault meet Brendan Dassey: Preventing
Juvenile False and Coerced Confessions in the Twenty-First Century, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS
OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 217– 26 (Kristin Henning, et al. eds 2018) (describing
interrogation practices that may lead to false confessions by juveniles); Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are
Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (2007).
30
Other articles on juveniles have not studied the term criminal prosecution and the historical rights of
minors. See, e.g., Tina Chen, Comment, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: Why is it a Fundamental
Right for Adults and Not Juveniles?, 28 J. JUV. L. 1 (2007); Public Trials, supra note 9; Gerald P. Hill, II,
Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth
Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143 (2008); Korine L. Larsen, Comment, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice
for All: Extending the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835 (1994); Carl
Rixey, Note, The Ultimate Disillusionment: The Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications, 58 CATH. U. L.
REV. 885 (2009); Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public Jury Trial: A Need for Today’s Juvenile Court,
76 JUDICATURE 230 (1993).
31
Judge Jeffrey Sutton has written about the importance of constitutional law decisions by state courts.
JEFFREY SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2018). This juvenile issue is an example of how the interpretation of the states could differ from the
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court.

THOMASSTICHPROOFS2_12.17.19

280

12/17/2019 10:47 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:273

continued to hold this right until some time after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment when state legislation made trial by judge possible. This
Part also concludes that even if the right to a jury trial is analyzed without
reference to the Sixth Amendment and only with respect to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, juveniles possess the right to a jury trial because it was
integral to the historic protection provided to the accused. Importantly, the jury
trial is necessary to fundamental fairness because judicial decision-making
cannot be equated with jury decision-making. Finally, Part III responds to
justifications for holding juvenile proceedings without a jury trial.

I.

JUVENILE COURTS AND THE CASELAW ON THE RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL

A. Juvenile Courts
Juvenile courts are a modern creation. Initially, in the United States, the same
court system processed all people, including children.32 Historically, minors had
some advantages. Children under seven were not prosecuted, and juveniles
under fourteen were given a rebuttable presumption of innocence.33 Outside of
these exceptions, juveniles accused of crimes were treated in the same manner
as adults.
In the nineteenth century, there were efforts to establish a system to
rehabilitate juveniles who committed crimes. A judge discussed some of the
problems that children faced if their treatment was the same as adults. Placing
children into facilities with adults “permitted them to become the outlaws and
outcasts of society; it criminalized them by the very methods that it used in
dealing with them.”34 A scholar criticized that past system under which “a child
of eight or nine could be marred for life by conviction of crime and subsequent
imprisonment with hardened criminals. Execution of the very young was not
unknown to the stern criminal law practices of the eighteenth century.”35
Recognizing these problems, in 1899, Cook County, Illinois established the
first special court for children accused of wrongdoing.36 In this court, only a
judge and the child were to appear in a nonadversarial proceeding.37 These

32
33
34
35
36
37

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1967).
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 23.
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
See Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 548 (1957).
SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2d ed. 2011).
Id.
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special courts for minors as well as separate facilities for confining them grew
across the United States and Europe.38 The creators of these separate courts and
detention centers believed that they could care for juveniles in a way that could
rehabilitate them.39
Organizers of the juvenile system wanted it to be very different from the
adult system because they thought the juvenile system could not be rehabilitative
otherwise.40 As mentioned, one of the main purposes of juvenile court was to
prevent children from being tried and treated as criminals like adults were.41 To
establish this system, they avoided some of the traditional aspects of criminal
proceedings.42 For example, a so-called “civil” system was established to avoid
the stigma attached to the criminal justice system.43 The judge had much
discretion and was to focus on the child, not the act allegedly committed by the
child.44 With this system came extremely informal proceedings that were not
public and that did not use jury trials, defense lawyers, and some of the rules of
evidence governing criminal cases.45 These ordinary protections for adults who
were accused of crimes were seen as hindrances to the rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile court system.46 The juvenile justice system even adopted a set of terms
designed to distance itself from the criminal law:
Juvenile proceedings were thus triggered by “petitions” rather
than “indictments” or “informations;” juveniles committed acts of
“delinquency” rather than “crimes;” they were subject to
“adjudications” rather than “trials;” and if adjudicated a delinquent,
they discovered their fate in “disposition” rather than “sentencing”
proceedings, which could lead to commitment to a “training school”
rather than a “prison” or “penitentiary.“47

Despite the purported rehabilitative focus of juvenile proceedings with the
38
See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAWRENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 88 (2008) (all
states had juvenile courts by 1925); Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal
Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 451 (1985).
39
See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 38, at 84–88.
40
See id. at 86, 88; Janet Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1098 (1991).
41
See Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 38, at 451–52; Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile
Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281, 282–83 (1967).
42
See Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 167, 170–71 (1966).
43
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
44
JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE 154 (Joan McCord, Cathy Spatz Widom, & Nancy A. Crowell,
eds., 2001).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Public Trials, supra note 9, at 10.
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apparently understanding judge at the helm, effectively judges do not decide the
fate of the children before them in many of the cases. Instead similar to criminal
proceedings for adults, in juvenile court, prosecutors regularly engage in forms
of plea bargaining.48 One report stated, “[s]tate studies of juvenile access to
counsel indicate that most juvenile cases—often as many as 90 percent—result
in a plea bargain”49 The justifications for the prevalent use of plea bargaining
parallel those in the adult courts—that is, that the system would overload without
pleas.50
When they engage in plea bargaining, prosecutors have significant authority,
and judges generally accept the pleas.51 Where prosecutors have such
authoritative control over juvenile proceedings,52 these settings look similar to
criminal proceedings that involve adults.
The adult-like treatment of juveniles by prosecutors is illustrated by the
National District Attorneys Association prosecution standard for the role of
prosecutors in plea bargaining with juveniles. It is “‘governed by both the
interests of the state and those of the juvenile, although the primary concern of
the prosecutor should be protection of the public interest as determined in the
exercise of traditional prosecutorial discretion.’”53
Many jurisdictions permit a prosecutor to bargain away the trial for a

48
See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Philosophical, Legal, and Systemic Aspects of Juvenile Court Plea
Bargaining, 39 CRIM. & DELINQ. 509, 510 (1993); Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Pleading Guilty in Juvenile Court:
Minimal Ado About Something Very Important to Young Defendants, 9 JUST. Q. 127, 133 (1992) (in 1992,
describing Mississippi as only jurisdiction to prohibit plea bargaining and discussing charge and sentencing
bargaining in the juvenile courts); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Plea Bargaining in Juvenile Court, 23 CRIM. JUST.
61, 61–62 (2008) (“[P]lea bargaining has become ever more important. The growth in caseloads for juvenile
public defenders and prosecutors has also contributed to the increasing number of plea bargains … The lawyer
may need to remind the prosecutor of the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile court and the underlying goals of
the juvenile justice system”).
49
See JUDITH B. JONES, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 204063, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: ACCESS TO COUNSEL 5 (2004).
50
RANDY HERTZ, MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 398 (2018). In juvenile proceedings, either the term admission
or disposition is used at times instead of the term guilty plea. See id at 381.
51
For example, if a prosecutor agrees to the sentence, the juvenile is more likely to receive this sentence.
See id. at 394–98. Prosecutors can agree to a variety of conditions as a part of a guilty plea including the facts
and the release of the juvenile. See id.
52
See id. at 397.
53
See Shepherd, supra note 48, at 62 (quoting James Shine & Dwight Price, Prosecutors and Juvenile
Justice: New Roles and Perspectives, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA
129–30 (Ira M. Schwartz, ed., 1992)). Innocent juveniles may falsely plead guilty more than adults. See Allison
D. Redlich & Reveka V. Shteynberg, To Plead or Not to Plead: A Comparison of Juvenile and Adult True and
False Plea Decisions, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 611, 611 (2016).
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juvenile for “probation without verdict (with the eventual outcome of dismissal
of the case and expungement of arrest records).”54 Even where the prosecutor
has made no commitment regarding the sentence upon a plea, juveniles likely
will benefit from pleading guilty.
[J]udges tend generally to give lighter sentences to juvenile
respondents who plead guilty, either because the judge regards the plea
as a sign of contrition and a first step toward rehabilitation or because
the judge wants, consciously or unconsciously, to express appreciation
for the respondent’s contribution to alleviating the problem of docket
congestion.55

Juveniles also can benefit collaterally as a result of pleading guilty. As one
example, because judges may decide where the juvenile is detained, a guilty plea
could influence this determination.56 Additionally, even where a plea offer is not
put forth as a benefit in exchange for forfeiting trial, in some jurisdictions,
defense attorneys know that judges will not consider certain valid defenses such
as the stand your ground defense in Georgia so, the attorneys recommend that a
minor takes a plea.57
In addition to this dark shadow of plea bargaining in juvenile courts, minors
have faced other similarities to adults that temper the stated rehabilitative goal
of juvenile courts. Many have been incarcerated for significant periods of time—
including for periods longer than adults convicted of the same crimes.58 Several
states can incarcerate juveniles for two-to-five year sentences, and some others
may impose twenty-to-thirty year sentences.59 Indeterminate sentencing can also
occur. In fact, “[i]n virtually all jurisdictions a sentence of incarceration (called
“commitment” in some jurisdictions and “placement” in others) is an
indeterminate sentence that, in theory, can extend to the minor’s age of

54
HERTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 381. Also, diversion may require a plea of guilty. See id. at 392. And
as for the sentence, “[u]sually, the sole choice [for the judge] is between probation and a uniform indeterminate
sentence.” See id. at 405. Where sentencing is indeterminate, judges cannot exercise much control. See id. at
392.
55
See id. at 398.
56
See id. at 393.
57
E-mail from Michael Tafelski, Attorney, S. Poverty Law Ctr., to author (Aug. 29, 2018, 11:26 AM)
(on file with author).
58
Juveniles in Corrections: Time in Placement, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08405.asp?qaDate
=2015 (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
59
See In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (15-year sentence); Sanborn, supra
note 30, at 235. However, the “typical term of incarceration for a juvenile in most jurisdictions is no longer than
18 months.” HERTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 392. “[A]lmost all … [are] released … within 12 to 18 months.”
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majority.”60 They have also been housed in detention facilities that look similar
to prison cells.61 Further, children have been locked in cells for days, improperly
isolated, wrongfully restrained, been subject to excessive force, been subject to
sexual abuse, and been incarcerated with adults.62 A Serial podcast illustrated
some of these issues.63
The rehabilitative purpose of juvenile proceedings is also belied by the
lasting effect of a conviction. After a judge tries and sentences a minor, this
conviction can be considered to enhance a future sentence if the individual is
convicted of another crime as a juvenile or as an adult;64 a judge can use this
past conviction by another judge to increase a sentence despite the Supreme
Court’s decisions that preclude judicial determination of facts that enhance an
adult’s sentence.65
The goal of rehabilitation also appears to be faltering based on changes that
states have made to their laws. Over the years, especially after political pressure
to combat crime in the 1980s, several states amended the purpose of the juvenile
courts “to emphasize public safety, certainty of sanctions, and offender
accountability.”66 The policy became “more concerned with social control and
punishment than with its historic mission of prevention and rehabilitation,” and,
not surprisingly, the rate of detention of juveniles increased.67 The rise of
victims’ rights and the opportunity to introduce statements at sentencing or
disposition also has the potential to conflict with the juvenile court’s purported
goal of rehabilitation.68

60

See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 392.
See Mike Fritz, Photo Essay: Life Inside a Juvenile Detention Center for Girls, PBS NEWS HOUR (Mar.
17, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/girls-justice; RICHARD ROSS, JUVENILE IN JUSTICE
28–29 (Don Kennison, ed., 2012); Carmen Winant, Inside America’s Juvenile-Detention System, TIME (May 26,
2015), https://time.com/3864814/juveniles-in-justice-richard-ross.
62
See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., MALTREATMENT OF YOUTH IN U.S. JUVENILE
CORRECTIONS FACILITIES: AN UPDATE 6, 22 (2015); Sanborn, supra note 30, at 238.
63
Set in Cleveland, it showed that there, juveniles had adult sentences hanging over them if they were
deemed to have not behaved in detention, that violence occurred regularly in detention, and that gang
membership was present. See A Madman’s Vacation, SERIAL (2018), https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/8/amadmans-vacation.
64
See Sanborn, supra note 30, at 235.
65
Feld, supra note 27, at 449–50; Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1195–22 (2003).
66
See JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 44, at 155.
67
Ira M. Schwartz, Martha Wade Steketee, & Jeffrey A. Butts, Business as Usual: Juvenile Justice
During the 1980s, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 377, 382, 384 (2012).
68
Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus
Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2009).
61
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B. Constitutional Protections for Juveniles Accused of Wrongdoing
In the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court began to question the ability of the
juvenile court systems in the states to adequately protect children accused of
crimes. Recognizing that minors had rights to due process, the Supreme Court
began to extend constitutional principles to juvenile delinquency adjudications.
The proliferation of protections abruptly ended in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
when the Court decided that juveniles did not possess the right to a jury trial
under the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause.69 Recently, some state
courts have reinvigorated this constitutional issue. In In re L.M., the Kansas
Supreme Court questioned McKeiver and extended the right to a jury trial to
juveniles.70 However, in In re Destiny P., the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
follow the Kansas Supreme Court and denied the right to a jury trial to a teenager
accused of committing murder.71 Recognizing the importance of the lack of the
right to a jury trial, some states have imposed other requirements in attempts to
protect youth.
1. Due Process Rights
In the 1960s, in Kent v. U.S.,72 In re Gault,73 and In re Winship,74 the
Supreme Court first extended procedural protections to juvenile proceedings. In
these cases, the Court emphasized the rehabilitative purposes of the states and
the role of the state as parens patriae or in a parental relationship with the

69

403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion).
See 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008).
71
See 102 N.E.3d 149, 161 (Ill. 2017).
72
383 U.S. 541 (1966). There, the Court decided that waiver to adult criminal court required certain
procedures. Id. at 552.
73
387 U.S. 1 (1967). The parents of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
after Gerald was placed in an Arizona state facility following a judicial decision that Gerald had placed an
obscene phone call to their neighbor. Id. at 4. There were several issues with the proceedings. Officers had taken
Gerald into custody and transported him to a juvenile detention facility without contacting Gerald’s parents. Id.
at 5. Then, neither Gerald nor his parents were given a copy of the charges. Id. The subsequent proceeding
regarding Gerald’s guilt occurred in the judge’s chambers where no record was created, no person was placed
under oath, and the neighbor who complained about the phone call was not present. Id. Shortly afterward, in
another proceeding, the judge committed Gerald to a detention facility for over five years—until he would reach
the age of twenty-one. Id. at 7–8. Because Gerald was adjudicated in a juvenile court, the judge was able to
commit Gerald for over five years, instead of the two-month maximum time to which an adult would be
sentenced for the same offense. Id. at 29. In his dissent, Justice Stewart argued that juveniles should not receive
the due process rights that adults possess. Id. at 78 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He feared a return to the system in
the nineteenth century where juveniles received the same protections as adults but also received the same
treatment, for example, execution for a crime. Id. at 79–80.
74
397 U.S. 358 (1970). There, the Court decided that a juvenile must be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 368.
70
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child.75 At the same time, it expressed skepticism about the success of the states
in achieving their goals for their juvenile courts, noting that:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the
process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults.
There is much evidence that some juvenile courts … lack the
personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as
representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with
respect to children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in
fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.76

The Court decided that juvenile proceedings must comply with due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.77 The set of
essential rights established in the three cases included notice of the charges,
assistance of counsel, rights of confrontation and cross-examination, protection
from self-incrimination, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.78 The Supreme
Court had found that juvenile dispositions were not “criminal prosecutions”
under the Sixth Amendment, and thus, various procedural safeguards could be
imposed without requiring that the juvenile justice system complies with the full
slate of constitutional protections of criminal cases.79 And various
characteristics of juvenile proceedings that could be protective of minors could
continue including private proceedings.80
In 1971, this wave of the Court’s extension of constitutional rights to
juveniles ended.81 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, a consolidated appeal of three
75
See Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. Describing the historical constitutional justification for the different
treatment of juveniles, the Court explained that a child had been deemed to be entitled only to “custody,” not
“liberty,” and the state had the power to intervene as parens patriae to take custody when parents failed to
perform the custodial role. Id.
76
Kent, 383 U.S. at 555–56; see also Gault, 387 U.S. at 21–22 (“neither sentiment nor folklore” prevented
the Court from seeing that the juvenile justice system does not always meet its rehabilitative premises).
77
Gault, 387 U.S. at 28 (“Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court.”).
78
See id. at 33, 41, 55, 57; Kent, 383 U.S. at 561; Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
79
Gault, 387 U.S. at 21–30.
80
Id. at 24–25; Winship, 397 U.S. at 366–67. It pointed out, however, that many jurisdictions permitted
the disclosure of juvenile records—effectively making the nature of juvenile proceedings public. Gault, 387 U.S.
at 24–25.
81
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528. Interestingly, this could have occurred as a result of the change in the
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cases, two from Pennsylvania and one from North Carolina, the Court declared
that the right to a jury trial was not a required protection for minors under the
Due Process Clause.82 In the first case, McKeiver was charged with robbery,
larceny, and receiving stolen goods.83 In the second case, Terry was charged
with assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy.84 The final case
involved several black children, including many who were engaged in a protest
and charged with traffic violations.85 The defendants argued they had a right to
a jury trial because of the substantial similarity between criminal trials and
juvenile proceedings.86 These included the initiation of proceedings through a
criminal charge in an indictment and in a petition, the placement in prison
facilities and in detention, and the stigma attached to those criminally convicted
and adjudicated delinquent.87 Moreover, defendants asserted that a jury trial
would not alter the character of juvenile adjudications and actually provided
“healthy public scrutiny.”88
While juvenile proceedings had been labeled civil in the past, the plurality
stated “[l]ittle, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt simplistically to call the
juvenile court proceeding either ‘civil’ or ‘criminal.’”89 With that said, because
Kent, Gault, and Winship did not conclude juvenile delinquency proceedings
were “criminal prosecutions” under the Sixth Amendment, this Amendment was
deemed irrelevant.90 Continuing to examine the issue of the right to a jury trial
from the perspective of due process as opposed to the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial, the plurality determined that denying juveniles jury trials did not
violate the fundamental fairness required by the Due Process Clause.91 It
discussed how the concept of fundamental fairness in juvenile court developed
in the Winship and Gault decisions. Specifically, whether fundamental fairness
was satisfied was based on the factfinding procedures.92 “[N]otice, counsel,
composition of the Court. See Zawadi Baharanyi & Randy Hertz, The Many Stories of In re Gault, in RIGHTS,
RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 11 (Kristin Henning,
Laura Cohen & Ellen Marrus eds., 2018) (explaining that both Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Abe Fortas
had left and were replaced by appointments by President Nixon). Since then, there have been other constitutional
protections extended to juveniles. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
82
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 535–38.
83
See id. at 534–35.
84
See id. at 535.
85
See id. at 536–37.
86
See id. at 541.
87
See id. at 541–42.
88
Id. at 542–43.
89
Id. at 541.
90
See id. at 541 (noting cases that discuss rehabilitative or civil nature of proceedings).
91
See id. at 543.
92
See id.
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confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof” were required given
this emphasis on factfinding.93 But the plurality asserted that the jury was not
important: “[O]ne cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary
component of accurate factfinding.”94 When it described the ability of judges to
substitute adequately for juries, the plurality emphasized that other proceedings
lacked jury trials such as those that involved equity, workmen’s compensation,
probate, deportation, and the military.95 Further, past decisions had not held that
judges were unfair or could never be as trustworthy as a jury.96 The plurality
pointed out that the jury system itself had been altered to less than twelve
required jurors, and thus flexibility had been permitted.97
The Court concluded with a list of reasons that the Constitution did not
require trial by jury for juvenile courts.98 None of the advanced reasons were
based in constitutional text or history, and many of them related to irrelevant
information such as the past actions of states and commissions not to require
jury trials for juveniles and the continuing ability of states to use juries if they
so choose.99
In concurring with the judgment that juries were not required in juvenile
court proceedings, Justice White agreed with the plurality about factfinding by
judges versus juries. He said that the jury was “not necessarily or even probably
better at the job than the conscientious judge.”100 He also stated that juvenile
proceedings had not been deemed criminal prosecutions so only due process was
required.101 Concluding, he stated that due process did not require jury trials in
juvenile court because there were “differences of substance between criminal
and juvenile courts.”102
Concurring and dissenting in part, Justice Brennan also agreed that only the
Due Process Clause could be violated because juvenile proceedings were not
criminal prosecutions.103 However, whether a proceeding complied with the
fundamental fairness that is required under the Due Process Clause had to be
examined on an individual basis, including evaluation of whether the interests
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 545–50.
See id.
Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
See id.
Id. at 553.
See id. at 553 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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underlying jury trials were satisfied.104 These included protection against
government oppression and a biased judge.105 He concluded that in
Pennsylvania, the public, which was not barred from juvenile proceedings, could
be a check on the government and thus due process was satisfied, while in North
Carolina such a protection did not exist, and as a result, due process was not
satisfied.106
In dissent, Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall stated that the youth
defendants should have had a right to a jury trial under the Due Process Clause
or the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.107 One child was subject to ten years of confinement, and the others
were subject to at least five years of confinement.108 In these circumstances, an
adult would have had a right to a jury trial.109 The relevant question here was not
whether states should engage in juvenile court endeavors, but rather whether a
juvenile was entitled to a jury trial if prosecuted for a crime and subject to
confinement.110 There was no plausible distinction between the rights already
required by the Court under due process and the right to a jury trial, which the
plurality had deemed not fundamental to fairness. In fact, the right to a jury trial
was “surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the Englishspeaking world.”111 Moreover, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed juveniles a
right to a jury trial for a crime for which an adult would hold a right to a jury
trial.112 The dissenting Justices also emphasized that the rehabilitative process
for a child begins with fair treatment, including the right to a jury trial.113

104

See id. at 554.
Id. (first quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1964) and then quoting Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
106
See id. at 555–57. Justice Harlan concurred due to his belief that jury trials are not required in states
based on the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring).
107
See id. at 558, 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
108
See id. at 560.
109
See id. (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162).
110
See id. at 559.
111
Id. at 561 (quoting DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 34 (1969)).
112
See id. at 561 (quoting DeBacker, 396 U.S. at 35).
113
See id. at 562. In 1969, in DeBacker v. Brainard, the Supreme Court considered a case where a
seventeen-year-old charged with forging a check was denied a jury trial. 396 U.S. at 28, 30. Although the
majority did not decide whether juveniles had a right to a jury trial, in dissent, Justices Black and Douglas
discussed this issue. Douglas emphasized that the purpose of the juvenile courts and state custody had not been
fulfilled: “This new agency—which stood in the shoes of the parent or guardian—was to draw on all the medical,
psychological, and psychiatric knowledge of the day and transform the delinquent. These experts motivated by
love were to transform troubled children into normal ones, saving them from criminal careers.” Id. at 36
(Douglas, J., dissenting). But Douglas pointed out many problems including that the “correctional institutions
designed to care for these delinquents often became miniature prisons with many of the same vicious aspects as
the adult models [and] the secrecy of the juvenile proceedings led to some overreaching and arbitrary actions.”
105
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2. State Court Decisions on the Right to a Jury Trial Under the U.S.
Constitution
Despite the lack of a federal constitutional right to a jury trial for minors,
states can grant juveniles the right by their own interpretation of the federal
Constitution, by statute, or by their own constitutions. But most states deny
juveniles an absolute right to a jury trial in every criminal case.114 According to
the National Juvenile Defender Center, only nine states grant juveniles this
right.115 And just nine others provide the right in specific circumstances,
including when the offense is violent, would have been a felony if committed by
an adult, or involves a repeat offender.116
As mentioned in McKeiver, some states previously decided that the U.S.
Constitution does not grant juveniles the right to a jury trial.117 Some courts that
previously held minors had no right to a jury trial have recently re-examined the
issue. In 2008, for example, in In re L.M., the Kansas Supreme Court considered
whether a juvenile accused of aggravated sexual battery and possession of
alcohol had a right to a jury trial under the U.S. Constitution via the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.118 There, a judge denied the sixteen-year-old minor’s
request for a jury trial and found the youth guilty.119 A sentence of eighteen
months was imposed, but it was stayed in favor of probation until the minor was
twenty.120 Among other obligations, the juvenile was required to register as a
sex offender.121 Although the Kansas Supreme Court had previously denied the
federal constitutional right to a jury trial to juveniles in a 1984 decision, it
recognized that the Kansas juvenile justice system had dramatically changed in
subsequent years.122 Since then, Kansas had changed key language in its
Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Regardless of the purported purpose of juvenile courts, Douglas stressed that
a juvenile possessed the right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when he was accused
of a crime that would entitle an adult to a jury trial. See id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He proclaimed
“[w]hether a jury trial is in conflict with the juvenile court’s underlying philosophy is irrelevant for the
Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land.” Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 548–49.
115
See Juvenile Right to Jury Trial Chart, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER CTR. (2014), http://njdc.info/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/Right-to-Jury-Trial-Chart-7-18-14.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). These states are:
Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming. See id.
116
See id. These include: Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Virginia,
and West Virginia. See id.
117
See 403 U.S. at 548.
118
In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008).
119
See id. at 165.
120
See id.
121
See id.
122
See Findlay v. State, 681 P.2d 20 (Kan. 1984), abrogated by L.M., 186 P.3d 164; see also
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 et seq. (Supp. 2019) (asserting a more punitive goal for the juvenile justice system,
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Juvenile Justice Code. Although the original wording of the statute referred to
juvenile proceedings as “juvenile adjudications,” this was altered to portray the
proceedings as “prosecutions” instead.123 Further, prosecutions were based on
allegations that juveniles had violated the criminal laws of the state,124 and
judges began to apply adult criminal procedure and sentencing standards in the
proceedings.125 The Kansas Supreme Court noted that the United States
Supreme Court had relied heavily on the juvenile justice system’s characteristics
of fairness, concern, and paternal attention to determine that juveniles had no
right to a jury trial.126 Because the Kansas juvenile justice system did not have
these attributes—but instead was patterned after the adult criminal system—the
Court concluded that McKeiver’s reasoning did not apply as binding
precedent127 and found that juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.128 Also worth mentioning,
although there is no right to a jury trial for juveniles in California, in 1984 a
court of appeals in California extensively analyzed why juveniles possessed the
right to a jury trial.129
In contrast to Kansas, Illinois, the state with the oldest juvenile court,
recently refused to recognize that juveniles possess the right to a jury trial under
the U.S. Constitution. Under Illinois law, only juvenile defendants with repeated
or violent criminal histories are eligible for jury trials.130 This law was
challenged in In re Destiny, P. There, a fourteen-year-old girl was charged with
killing a fellow fourteen-year-old following a fight regarding a romantic
dispute.131 The accused girl’s request for a jury trial was denied because she had
no previous criminal history.132 If convicted of the crime, the minor would be

adopting a sentencing matrix, and stripping away many of the parens patriae protective measures originally put
in place).
123
See L.M., 186 P.3d at 167.
124
L.M., 186 P.3d at 165.
125
See id. at 172.
126
See id. at 170.
127
See id.
128
See id. Because the Kansas court had abandoned its parens patriae character and transformed into a
system for prosecuting juveniles, the court also concluded that this now fit within Section 10 of the Kansas
Constitution’s Bill of Rights and its jury trial right in “all prosecutions.” Id. at 172; see also KAN. CONST. Bill
of Rights § 10.
129
In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
130
See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-620 (Supp. 1999).
131
Megan Crepeau, State Supreme Court Rules Teen Cannot Be Tried by Jury in Endia Martin’s Killing,
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-supremecourt-jury-trial-20171018-story.html.
132
See In re Destiny, P., 103 N.E.3d 149 (Ill. 2017).
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incarcerated for at least five years before being eligible for parole.133 The teen
raised a due process argument under the U.S. Constitution to argue that she had
a right to a jury trial, but the Illinois Supreme Court—with citations to previous
state authority and McKeiver—held that jury trials for juveniles were not
required as a matter of due process.134
While many states do not recognize the right to a jury trial for minors, some
states have acknowledged that they must try to compensate for this lack of a
potential shield with other protections. More extensive appellate review is one
avenue.135 Other states have held that a juvenile cannot be held in adult
correctional facilities if he is denied a jury trial.136 Still other states have
precluded judges from using a conviction from a juvenile proceeding to enhance
the sentence of an individual who was convicted as an adult.137 The revisitation
of the constitutional issue in the states, as well as the additional protections
imposed by the states upon the denial of the right to a jury trial, demonstrate the
continued importance of the issue of the right to a jury trial for juveniles.

II. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR JUVENILES UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
As described previously, the Supreme Court has held that the right to a jury
trial in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment is based on the historical
right. As discussed below, juveniles had such a right to a jury trial. The first
Section investigates the meaning of criminal prosecution in the Sixth
Amendment. Having shown the relevance of the Sixth Amendment, the second
Section describes the historical role of the jury for adults and juveniles. Finally,
the last Section contrasts the Supreme Court’s analysis of the right to a jury trial
for petty offenses to its treatment of the right to a jury trial for juveniles.
A. Criminal Prosecution Under the Sixth Amendment
Instead of relying on the prescribed examination of history to analyze the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial for juveniles, the Supreme Court has
133

See id. at 158.
See id. at 160.
135
See In re A.K., 825 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Iowa 2013) (stating “juvenile proceedings differ from criminal
proceedings in … [the] important respect … [that] [n]either statutory nor constitutional provisions guarantee
juveniles the right to a jury trial,” and “[t]his important distinction between adult and juvenile proceedings favors
a more in-depth appellate review of the facts supporting and opposing an adjudication”).
136
See, e.g., In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391 (La. 1998); In re Jeffrey C., 781 A.2d 4, 7 (N.H. 2001); In re
Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1998).
137
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276 (La. 2004); State v. Hand, 73 N.E.3d 448 (Ohio 2016).
134
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adopted the notion that they do not hold the right simply because the Sixth
Amendment is irrelevant; the prosecution of youth in juvenile court cannot be
criminal prosecutions under the Sixth Amendment because the state courts claim
their purpose is rehabilitative. To make this conclusion, however, the Court has
not analyzed the meaning of criminal prosecutions.
1. Previous Interpretations
To deny the constitutionally-mandated right to a jury trial to juveniles, there
must be some basis to do so. In McKeiver, without analysis, a plurality of the
Supreme Court said that a juvenile court proceeding “ha[d] not yet been held to
be a ‘criminal prosecution’” under the Sixth Amendment, and therefore the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions was irrelevant to the
question of whether juveniles possessed the right to a jury trial.138 The plurality
cited three of its past decisions, all of which did not analyze the meaning of
criminal prosecution.139 Instead, those former decisions relied on the idea that
juvenile proceedings were rehabilitative or civil.
Despite these previous characterizations, in McKeiver, the plurality
acknowledged that a juvenile proceeding “ha[d] not yet been regarded as devoid
of criminal aspects.”140 In past decisions, the Supreme Court had, in fact,
recognized similarities between criminal proceedings and juvenile proceedings.
For example, in Gault, it stated for a child to be found “delinquent and subjected
to the loss of liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to felony
prosecution.”141
In McKeiver, while the plurality did not refer to the proceedings as “civil,”
it continued to reject that juvenile proceedings and criminal prosecutions could
be “equated.”142 It did so with an emphasis on the best intentions of the states,
including “every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal
attention” of their systems for juveniles.143

138

McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
See id. (first citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966), then citing In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 17, 49–50 (1967), and then citing In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 365–66 (1970)).
140
Id.
141
Gault, 387 U.S. at 36; see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975) (“[N]o persuasive distinction
… between the [juvenile] proceeding conducted in this case … and a criminal prosecution, each of which is
designed ‘to vindicate (the) very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.’” (quoting United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971))). With that said, protections there were based on the Due Process Clause, not the
Sixth Amendment. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 37 (1976).
142
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
143
Id. at 550.
139
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States have decided somewhat similarly. In cases on whether youth possess
the right to a jury trial in juvenile court, several states have relied on differences
between the purported civil rehabilitative juvenile system and the adult criminal
system as support for their decisions not to impose the full protections of the
Sixth Amendment into juvenile proceedings including the right to a jury trial.144
However, there have been differences of opinion. For example, some years ago,
one state court judge recognized “[t]he argument that the adjudication of
delinquency is not the equivalent of criminal process is spurious.”145
Many scholars have also disputed purported differences between juvenile
proceedings and criminal prosecutions.146 They have argued that the
rehabilitation-based juvenile justice system began to fade over time for a variety
of reasons, including the adoption of determinate and mandatory minimum
sentencing.147 Consequently, the juvenile system has changed to one that is
punitive in nature and substantially similar to the criminal justice system.
2. The Meaning of Criminal Prosecution
To determine the substance of different provisions of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has consulted the text and sources that were written at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution. So, to explore the meaning of the term
criminal prosecution in the Sixth Amendment, authorities at the time of the
adoption of the Amendment should be examined.
First, we see the use of criminal prosecution outside of the Sixth
Amendment. At the time, the constitutions of several of the fourteen states used
criminal prosecution in the context of the right to a jury trial similar to the Sixth
Amendment.148 As one example, Delaware’s Constitution stated,”[i]n all
144
See Ex parte Januszewski, 196 F. 123 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1911); People ex rel. O’Connell v. Turner, 55
Ill. 280, 281 (1870); Van Walters v. Bd. of Children’s Guardians, 132 Ind. 567 (1892); State ex rel. Olson v.
Brown, 50 Minn. 353 (1892); Prescott v. Ohio, 19 Ohio 184 (1869); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (1905);
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473 (1907).
145
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 571 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
146
See supra note 9.
147
See Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP
Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 25, 31 (2007).
148
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1818) (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right … and
in all prosecutions, by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”); DEL. CONST. art.
I, § 7 (1792); GA. CONST. art. XXXIX, § 1 (1777) (“All matters of dispute, both civil and criminal, in any county
where there is not a sufficient number of inhabitants to form a court.”); MD. CONST. art. XIX (1776) (“[I]n all
criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right … to a speedy trial by an impartial jury.”); N.H. CONST. art. 1,
§ 17 (1792) (“In criminal prosecutions, the trial of facts in the vicinity where they happen, is so essential to the
security of the life, liberty and estate of the citizen, that no crime or offense ought to be tried in any other county
than that in which it is committed … except in cases of general insurrection … when it appear … that an impartial
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criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to … a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury.”149 As another example, Pennsylvania’s Constitution stated,
“[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to “a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury ….”150
To further determine what criminal prosecution means, we can examine
other authorities at the time of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. Samuel
Johnson’s Dictionary from 1785 defines the adjective criminal as “faulty;
contrary to right; contrary to duty; contrary to law,” “guilty; tainted with crime;
not innocent,” or “not civil: as a criminal prosecution; the criminal law.”151
Further, Blackstone describes a crime as “an act committed, or omitted, in
violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it.”152 He
distinguishes private wrongs or civil injuries from public wrongs or crimes.153
The former are “an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to
individuals” while the latter are “a breach and violation of the public rights and
duties, due to the whole community.”154 In juvenile court, minors are accused of
committing crimes against the law, and thus criminal in criminal prosecutions
appears satisfied.155
In addition to defining criminal, the Johnson dictionary defines
trial cannot be had.”); N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (1844) (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.”); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1846) (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions,
… the truth may be given in evidence to the jury.”); N.C. Declaration of Rights § 9 (1776) (“[N]o freeman shall
be convicted of any crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in open court …”);
PENN. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1790); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1842) (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, … the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”); see also S.C. CONST. art. XXXIV (1776) (“[I]n lieu of all
charges against the public for fees upon criminal prosecutions.”); VA. Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776) (“[T]hat
in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right … to a speedy trial by an impartial jury.”); VT. CONST.
ch. I, § X (1793) (“[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to … a speedy public trial, by
an impartial jury.”). Some states use “prosecutions” in the context of the right to a jury trial, while others
emphasize its use in “criminal” cases. Compare N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1821) (“[I]n all prosecutions … the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury.”), with MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES art. XXIX (1641) (granting jury
trial right in “Criminal cases”).
149
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1792).
150
PENN. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1790).
151
1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785) (emphasis added); see
also NOAH WEBSTER, COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1806). See generally Carey M.
McIntosh, Eighteenth-Century English Dictionaries and the Enlightenment, 28 YEARBOOK OF ENG. STUD. 3
(1998) (providing background on the intersection of lexicon and dictionaries during the Enlightenment).
152
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 5.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
When juvenile courts began, some children might be subject to the state’s custody when they
committed acts that were not crimes. Now, however, minors are brought into juvenile proceedings solely for
accusations of committing crimes. As a result, in juvenile proceedings, the “criminal” aspect of criminal
prosecutions in the Sixth Amendment appears satisfied.
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“prosecution.” It is defined as a “[s]uit against a man in a criminal cause.”156 In
sum, a criminal prosecution would be a suit against a person accused of an act
against the law. Consequently, a juvenile would be subject to “criminal
prosecution” in juvenile court, because the government brings a case against the
minor who is accused of committing an act that is contrary to the law.
To further investigate the meaning of criminal prosecution, we can examine
related words—“punishment” in the Eighth Amendment and “conviction.”
Punishments can result from convictions from criminal prosecutions under the
Sixth Amendment. Johnson defines conviction as “[d]etection of guilt, which is,
in law, either when a man is outlawed, or appears and confesses, or else is found
guilty by the inquest.”157 Johnson defines punishment as “[a]ny infliction or pain
imposed in vengeance of a crime.”158 Blackstone also described punishment as
that which is “consequent upon crimes.”159 These definitions also lead to the
conclusion that because a youth can be punished by detention when convicted
of committing an act against the law, the government is engaged in a criminal
prosecution.
In summary, after a judge determines that a juvenile has committed a crime,
the state can detain the minor in a facility for some period of time and take away
the freedom of the minor. In other words, the state can inflict punishment
outlawing or detaining the minor for the conviction of a crime by the judge. So,
juveniles are prosecuted for crimes by the state’s attorney of the county where
they are charged, and then they are punished for convictions of those crimes
within the meaning of criminal prosecutions in the Sixth Amendment and
punishment in the Eighth Amendment.160
For a concrete example of whether a juvenile proceeding is a criminal
prosecution, we can examine one of the cases in McKeiver. There, a child was
charged with committing the crimes of robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen
goods and could receive a sentence of five years. So, the child was prosecuted
for crimes and could be punished with significant time in detention upon
conviction of the crimes. Thus, this proceeding was a criminal prosecution as set
forth in the Sixth Amendment.

156

2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).
Id.
158
Id. at 6.
159
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 7.
160
Cf. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 377–78 (1986) (comparing Illinois’s “sexually dangerous person”
proceeding to Illinois’s criminal law proceeding).
157
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3. Good Purpose
Given the actual meaning of criminal prosecution—that is, that juvenile
prosecutions fit within it—the Court, in denying the right to a jury trial to
juveniles, is essentially asserting that it can deny the right if the state believes it
is doing so for a good purpose—in McKeiver, for a rehabilitative purpose.
However, outside of this juvenile context, the good purpose of the state has not
been sufficient to alleviate the state’s constitutional obligations to provide the
right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. As one example, in Bloom v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a person charged with serious contempt of
court possessed the right to a jury trial even though the state argued that
summary disposal of the charges by a judge without a jury trial was “necessary
to preserve the dignity, independence, and effectiveness of the judicial
process.”161 Moreover, where there is historical support for certain constitutional
rights, the Supreme Court has not permitted relief from the obligation to be based
on the state’s good purpose. In District of Columbia v. Heller, for instance, the
Court stated that despite the good purposes of the District of Columbia for its
handgun restrictions, including the prevention of deaths, the historical right to
bear a handgun had to be recognized.162 It emphasized that “the enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”163
When the Court discussed limitations on the right to bear arms, the Court did
not discuss the purpose of the state but instead relied on history to support those
restrictions. “[T]he sorts of weapons protected were [only] those ‘in common
use at the time.’”164 Further, the “limitation [was] fairly supported by the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons.’”165
It is true that, at times, the Supreme Court has analyzed the purpose of the
state to decide whether a right is violated. For example, in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, it discussed purpose in the context of
whether equal protection was violated. There, the Court held a state policy that
favored veterans was constitutional; its neutral, legitimate, and worthy purposes
were apparent, and the state did not seek to discriminate against women.166
161

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008); id. at 693–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163
Id. at 636.
164
Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
165
Id. at 627 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 148–49 (1769)); see also Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (noting that automobiles are distinguishable from other forms of property because of
the practical differences due to the inherent mobility of cars and the lessened expectation of privacy through
configuration, use, and regulation).
166
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
162
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These reviews of purpose occur in contexts where the constitutional provision is
somewhat vague and not in situations where a specific right is historically
based.167
In conclusion, juvenile courts fall within the definition of criminal
prosecutions under the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, where the state acts with
a good purpose in juvenile courts—in a manner like a parent and to
rehabilitate—the Sixth Amendment continues to require a historical analysis to
determine the scope of juveniles’ right to a jury trial.
B. The Historical Role of the Jury
As described above, because youth face criminal prosecution in juvenile
proceedings, the Sixth Amendment is relevant to those proceedings. So, the
question is whether youth in juvenile proceedings possess the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.
Historically, juries served important roles in England and in America. For
example, they prevented people from being prosecuted for criticizing the
government, from serving time for the violation of unjust laws, or from being
punished by penalties thought to be too severe. Because the English would
sometimes deprive the colonists of trial by jury,168 when the Constitution was
established, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases set forth in the Constitution
and the Sixth Amendment was integral. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
stated that “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury.”169 The Sixth Amendment, adopted thereafter, ensured that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to … an impartial jury
….”170 It was adopted to “define with greater specificity ‘the essential features
of the trial required by § 2 of article 3’”171 and has been held to apply to the

327 (2003) (noting that context matters when reviewing governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause).
167
The Due Process Clause is another example. “‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951). The Court has emphasized the balancing that the government must do to
ensure the “fairness … between individual and government.” Id. at 162–63. This context is very different from
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, where the Court has stated that the availability of the right is based on
the historical right at a set point in time. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
168
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (“For depriving us in many cases, of the benefit
of Trial by Jury….”).
169
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
170
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that in all criminal prosecutions, a defendant is entitled “to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”).
171
See Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and
the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 383 (2012) (citing Callan v. Wilson, 127
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states.172
The Supreme Court has stated that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
is “a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all the
essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when the
Constitution was adopted….”173 History governs because the “the word ‘jury’
and the words ‘trial by jury’ were placed in the Constitution of the United States
with reference to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country
and in England at the time of the adoption of that instrument.”174
To determine, then, whether a juvenile has the right to a jury trial, the rights
afforded to juveniles at common law in England at the time of the adoption of
the Sixth Amendment, as well as the rights of juveniles in America at the time
of the adoption of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, must be examined.
The Supreme Court has not done so in any complete manner. As previously
mentioned, in McKeiver, in denying minors the right under the Sixth
Amendment, it simply proclaimed that juvenile adjudications were not criminal
proceedings subject to the Sixth Amendment.175 Prior to that, in Gault, without
analysis, the Court briefly mentioned that juveniles historically held the same
rights as adults in actual criminal proceedings.176 Those rights did not matter to
the Court, however. The concept of parens patriae was cited for the power of
the state to take away the rights of youth who are adjudicated in juvenile courts,
even though the Court recognized parens patriae had been applicable only
regarding civil issues such as property interests and custody of the child and not
to criminal cases.177
An analysis of the rights of juveniles accused of crimes shows that
historically they enjoyed the right to a jury trial, and state authority over children
did not preclude this right. In England, at the time of the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment in the late eighteenth century, minors accused of crimes enjoyed
the right to a jury trial, and subsequent English legislation to alter that right
confirmed that youth possessed the right to a jury trial in the late eighteenth
century. Moreover, the parens patriae relationship did not affect this right.

U.S. 540, 549–50 (1888)).
172
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145 (1968).
173
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
174
Id. at 289.
175
The Supreme Court has acted similarly in other contexts. It has decided that the rights available in
criminal contempt proceedings are not required in civil contempt hearings. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431,
441–43 (2011).
176
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1967).
177
Id. at 16; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 265 (1984).
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Additionally, no special juvenile courts existed in England in the late eighteenth
century. Finally, the right of juveniles to juries in America in the late eighteenth
century and at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
subsequent legislation that altered that right, also support that juveniles held the
right to a jury trial. Again, the parens patriae relationship did not affect this
right, and no special juvenile courts existed at that time.
1. Juvenile Jury Rights in England
a. English Legal Commentary
As described briefly above, the English placed a high value on the right to a
jury trial. The English commentator William Blackstone, who was very
influential in America, praised the jury right as a filter that would prevent
England from becoming like the failed civilizations of the past.178 In the late
eighteenth century, he wrote: “[Trial] by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will
be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And if it has so great an
advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much must that
advantage be heightened, when it is applied to criminal cases!”179 Blackstone
also described the jury right as a citizen’s greatest honor: “[It] is the most
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot
be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by unanimous
consent of twelve of his neighbors ….”180
Juveniles possessed this right when they were prosecuted for crimes. Their
treatment differed from adults in limited ways. They could not be prosecuted for
some crimes, and they could assert the defense of infancy. Blackstone described
that English children below age twenty-one were considered “infants” and could
“escape fine, imprisonment, and the like” for some misdemeanors.181 But for
“notorious breaches of the peace” such as “battery” a child fourteen or above
was “equally liable to suffer” as if he were twenty-one.182 For felonies for which
a person could be put to death, youth who were under seven could not be found
guilty.183 Those who were seven to thirteen were provided a rebuttable
presumption that they were mentally incapable but at times were found mentally

178

See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1780).
Id.
180
Id.
181
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 22.
182
Id. at 22–23; cf. Craig S. Lerner, Originalism and the Common Law Infancy Defense, 67 AM. U. L.
REV. 1577 (2017) (describing the nuances of the common law infancy defense).
183
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 23.
179
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capable.184 Blackstone stated that, in these circumstances, if it appeared to the
“court and jury” that the child could differentiate between good and evil, they
could be convicted by a jury and even be put to death.185 Similarly, in the late
eighteenth century, Sir Matthew Hale’s summation of the law surrounding youth
also supports that where they could be prosecuted, juries would decide their guilt
or innocence.186 He said that if it appeared to the court and “jury” that the child
could discern between good and evil at the time of the offense, he could be
convicted and undergo judgment and execution.187
b. English Cases and Secondary Sources
English case law and secondary sources in and around the late eighteenth
century also support that English juveniles possessed the right to a jury trial.
Distinctions between juveniles and adults were described, and the right to a jury
trial was not one of them. When children were accused of crimes, juries tried
those who were of an age where they could be held accountable. Examples from
the eighteenth and the early-to-mid-nineteenth centuries are mentioned below.
While these cases do not directly state that juveniles possessed a right to a jury
trial—consistent with treatise writers’ description of the trial by jury of youth—
these cases show that juries tried children in and around the late eighteenth
century. Thereafter, the next subsection describes how legislation to take away
the jury trial from children followed this period, confirming that young people
who were tried for crimes received jury trials in the relevant late eighteenth
century period similar to adults.
A case in the mid-eighteenth century, the Case of William York, shows at
least some youth were tried by jury. There, a ten-year-old boy allegedly brutally
murdered a five-year-old girl.188 The boy had confessed to the crime, and a
“jury” had convicted him.189 In another case in that period, the Case of Elizabeth
Harris, “the jury” had previously convicted fourteen-year-old Elizabeth Harris
along with another person of arson.190 Due to her age, Elizabeth was reprieved
and subject to transportation.191
Several cases in the early nineteenth century also show youth tried by jury.
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 23.
Id.
See 1 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 16–29 (1736).
Id. at 22, 26–29.
See The Case of William York (1748) 168 Eng. Rep. 35, 35, Fost. 70, 71.
See id. at 36.
See The Case of Elizabeth Harris (1753) 168 Eng. Rep. 56, 56–57, Fost. 113, 113–15.
Id.
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In Rex v. John Davis, a “little boy” had been charged with burglary for breaking
a window to steal property at a house.192 A “jury convicted the prisoner.”193 In
another case, C. Langstaffe’s Case, a jury convicted a twelve-year-old boy of
manslaughter.194 After being refused chips from an apprentice in a woodshop,
the boy threw a sharp knife at the apprentice, and the apprentice died.195 At trial,
“the jury found the [child] guilty” of manslaughter.196 In a third case, Rex v.
Elizabeth Owen, a ten-year-old girl was accused of stealing coals.197 The court
cited York for the proposition that a ten-year-old could be convicted of
murder.198After a discussion that the jury must find that she knew what she was
doing was wrong, the court stated that “I think I must leave it to the Jury,” and
after a verdict of not guilty, the foreman of the jury stated that “[w]e do not think
that the prisoner had any guilty knowledge.”199 In Rex v. Groombridge, the
prisoner—who was younger than fourteen—was indicted for rape of a child who
was under ten.200The court discussed the traditional rule that you must be
fourteen to be convicted of rape. As a result, the court directed “the jury” to find
the defendant not guilty.201 In a similar case, Regina v. Jordan and Cowmeadow,
the judge told the jury that the boy John Jordan must be fourteen years old to be
convicted of an offense similar to rape against a girl who was under the age of
ten, and the jury found the defendant not guilty.202
Some cases in the mid-nineteenth century also suggest youth held the right
to a jury trial. In Regina v. Brimilow, the defendant was under fourteen and
accused of raping a girl who was eleven.203 The judge “directed the jury to acquit
of the rape,” and instead, “[t]he jury found him guilty of the assault.”204 In a
somewhat similar case, Regina v. Smith, a ten-year-old boy was accused of
maliciously setting fire to a hayrick.205 Upon the judge’s instruction that the
defendant was presumed incapable of committing the crime, “the jury” found
him not guilty.206 In another case, Regina v. Elizabeth Garner, the jury convicted
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

R v. John Davis (1823) 168 Eng. Rep. 917, 917, Russ. & Ry. 498, 499.
Id. at 918.
See C. Langstaffe’s Case (1827) 168 Eng. Rep. 998, 998, 1 Lewin 161, 163.
See id.
Id.
See R v. Elizabeth Owen (1830) 172 Eng. Rep. 685, 685, 4 Car. & P. 236, 236–37.
Id.at 685–86.
See id. at 685–86.
See R v. Groombridge (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 256, 256–57, 7 Car. & P. 581, 582–83.
Id. at 256–57.
See R v. Jordan (1839) 173 Eng. Rep. 765, 766–67, 9 Car. & P. 119, 120.
See R v. Brimilow (1840) 169 Eng. Rep. 49, 49, 2 Mood. 123, 123.
Id.
See R v. Smith (1845) 1 Cox 260, 260.
Id.
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a young, thirteen-year-old girl.207 There, “the jury” heard her confession that she
tried to kill her employer and convicted her.208 In a final example, The Queen v.
George Read and Others, three boys, who were eleven, twelve, and thirteen,
were accused of common assault of a nine-year-old girl. “[T]he jury” that heard
the case convicted the boys.209
Other writings from the time period also support that children accused of
crimes received jury trials. In a plea to his fellow townsfolk, George Teale
criticized a post-trial investigation after a jury acquitted two boys accused of
stealing velveteen.210 In the original case, the boys were accused of stealing from
the owner of a dye house.211 Both stated that an unknown man had given them
the pieces of velvet to carry in return for payment.212 After describing a man that
resembled the person who had reported the crime, the court arranged for that
man to sit in the courtroom.213 Upon his arrival, both boys cried out “that is the
man who gave us the goods.”214 After a lengthy trial, and in part because of this
demonstration, “a discerning and honest jury” acquitted the two boys.215
In addition to historical accounts of famous trials, records were kept of
juveniles whom juries found guilty of capital offenses and sentenced to death.216
In 1730, for example, there were written accounts of three juveniles who were
executed after a jury found them guilty.217 A jury found John Mines, who was
sixteen years old, guilty of armed robbery for holding a pistol to a man’s head
and stealing his hat, money, and the bacon that he was carrying.218 A jury also
convicted George Wych, who was almost eighteen years old, of assault, theft,
and placing the assaulted in fear of his life.219 Finally, a jury found fifteen-yearold Bernard Fink guilty of assault of a woman on a highway.220
207

See R v. Elizabeth Garner (1848) 169 Eng. Rep. 267, 267–68, 1 Den. 327, 329–30.
Id.
209
See The Queen v. George Read and Others (1848) 169 Eng. Rep. 288, 288, 290, 1 Den. 377, 380.
210
See GEORGE TEALE, A REFUTATION OF A REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE OF WILLIAM
HINDLEY, CHARGED WITH FELONY, AND WITH FALSELY PREFERRING AN ACCUSATION AGAINST RICHARD HILL
& THOMAS LEAR 6, 13, 38 (1818).
211
Id. at 13–15.
212
Id. at 17.
213
Id. at 18.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 6.
216
See THE ORDINARY OF NEWGATE, HIS ACCOUNT OF THE BEHAVIOUR, CONFESSIONS, AND DYING
WORDS, OF THE MALEFACTORS, WHO WERE EXECUTED AT TYBURN, ON WEDNESDAY THE 23D OF THIS INSTANT
DECEMBER, 1730 3 (1730).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 14.
219
See id. at 15–17.
220
See id. at 10–11.
208
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c. Subsequent English Legislation as Support
In the nineteenth century, legislation was proposed to alter the right to a jury
trial for juveniles. This effort demonstrates that youth previously possessed the
right in England at the time of adoption of the Sixth Amendment in the late
eighteenth century.
Beginning in 1836, as a response to inquiries from magistrates who had
presided over criminal cases and preliminary examinations of minors in the late
eighteenth century, a royal commission was appointed “to consider whether it
was advisable ‘to make any distinction in the mode of trial between adult and
juvenile offenders, and if not, whether any class of offenders can be made
subject to a more summary proceeding than trial by jury.’”221 This commission
concluded that “a distinction in the mode of trial would not be advisable.”222
Despite this conclusion, a bill was introduced in 1840 to create a separate
court for children under the age of sixteen who were charged with committing
minor offenses.223 Under this bill, a juvenile would be tried by a magistrate
without a jury.224 Magistrates were to treat the juvenile as would a “father over
his son” and would decide whether the minor was guilty of the charged
offense.225 Despite passage in the House of Commons, the bill failed in the
House of Lords, which found it “unconstitutional.”226 It was defeated because
there “would be no end to juvenile offences, juvenile goals, juvenile courts and
all that, without the benefit to the prisoners of trial by jury. The principle of the
bill was unconstitutional because it conferred a power upon … magistrates to
become judge, jury, and executioner at once.”227
In 1847, Parliament successfully passed a more conservative bill.228 The
Juvenile Offenders Act of 1847 authorized “summary nonjury trials” for what
the bill characterized as “trivial crimes” (e.g., simple larceny) by juveniles and
capped the maximum time in detention that the court could impose at three
months.229 The Act did not abolish the right to a jury trial for juveniles, however.
221

REPORT OF DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE TREATMENT OF YOUNG OFFENDERS 11 (1927).
Id.
223
A Bill to Authorize the Summary Conviction of Juvenile Offenders in Certain Cases of Larceny and
Misdemeanor, and to Provide Places for Holding Petty Sessions of the Peace 1840, HC Bill [48] cl. 1.
224
Id.
225
In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 935 (1984) (quoting 52 Parl Deb HC (3rd ser.) (1840)).
226
See id. at 935–36 (citing PARSLOE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 114 (1979)).
227
PHYLLIDA PARSLOE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 114 (1979).
228
An Act for the More Speedy Trial and Punishment of Juvenile Offenders 1847 HC Bill [9Q] cl. 1.
229
In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 936 (citing Act for the More Speedy Trial and Punishment at cl.
1).
222
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It specifically allowed the juvenile to demand a jury trial:
[I]f the Person charged shall, upon being called upon to answer the
Charge, object to the Case being summarily disposed of under the
Provisions of this Act, such Justices shall, instead of summarily
adjudicating thereupon, deal with the Case in all respects as if this Act
had not been passed.230

Later, in 1850, Parliament reconsidered a bill where minors would not hold
the right to a jury trial.231 Under this bill, upon conviction by a judge, juveniles
would be sent to industrial schools of reform that would be created. Upon
conviction of their third offense, minors were subject to up to seven years in
prison.232 Among other criticisms in the defeat of this bill was the denial of the
right to trial by jury to juveniles.233
Subsequently in the early twentieth century, a specific juvenile court was
created.234 Even then, minors accused of a crime could opt for a jury trial outside
of the juvenile court in England.235 Currently, in England, for certain crimes,
minors do not hold the right to jury trial.236
d. Misconception of Parens Patriae and Civil Wardship
Many states in the United States will take custody of a juvenile accused of a
crime after only a judge has found the juvenile delinquent—in other words,
without requiring a conviction by a jury. With that said, the state must have a
lawful reason to take custody of a child. The only explicit constitutional basis
for a state’s authority to take custody of an individual is its power under the Sixth
Amendment to take custody after a jury convicts the youth or he pleads guilty
and waives the right to a jury trial.
At times, including implicitly in McKeiver and after the McKeiver decision,
the Supreme Court has invoked the concept of parens patriae to support a
court’s special power over a minor.237 However, the historical circumstances
surrounding parens patriae were very limited and did not permit the state to take
230

Act for the More Speedy Trial and Punishment at cl. 1.
A Bill for The Correction and Reformation of Juvenile Offenders and the Prevention of Juvenile
Offences 1850 HC Bill [108] cl. 1, 13, 22.
232
Id.
233
In re Javier A, 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 939–40 (Cal. App. Ct. 1984).
234
Children Act 1908, 8 Edw. 7 c. 67, § 111 (Eng.).
235
Id.
236
Children and Young Persons Act of 1933, 23 Geo. 5 c. 12, § 45-49 (Eng.).
237
See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (parens patriae interest in preserving and
protecting welfare of child “makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial”).
231
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custody of a minor accused of a crime without a jury trial. Writing about the
historical use of parens patriae when the state took custody of a juvenile, Neil
Cogan described that there were various interests the state sought to further,
including “the preservation of juvenile estates; the furtherance of juvenile
education; and the protection of juveniles from improper marriages.”238 Where
a state took custody generally appeared to involve a request by one parent for
the state to prevent another parent from taking some action, or the state acting
because the parent himself had acted inappropriately.239 The child had not
committed wrongdoing in any of the cases where the state became involved in a
parens patriae relationship.240
The English Infant Felons Act of 1840 supports the fact that children always
had a right to a jury trial even in circumstances involving the state’s wardship.241
There, the English first sought to establish wardship over a child accused of a
felony.242 However, the courts had the power to declare wardship only after a
juvenile had been convicted of an offense in courts of law—where juveniles
enjoyed the right to a jury trial.243 Parliament specifically highlighted this post-

238
Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of Parens Patriae, 22 S.C. L. REV.
147, 147 (1970).
239
See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 202–03,
205–06 (1978); see also In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 941 (1984).
240
In the early twentieth century, a judge also explained that this relationship was not created except where
there was property associated with the child so that the state would have the resources to care for the child. See
Mack, supra note 34, at 104. The judge emphasized that the state could not care for all children. Id. However,
writing about the property requirement, a judge discussed how especially in the mid and late nineteenth century,
English courts recognized that property was not required for the state to make an order regarding a child. See In
re Spence (1847) 41 Eng. Rep. 937, 937–38; 2 PH. 247, 249. For example, in In re Spence, the court held that
without property of the child to protect, the court still had jurisdiction to order that children taken by one parent
be given to the other parent. Id. A Justice on the Supreme Court and a historian have both recognized the doubtful
extension of the doctrine to permit the state to take a child accused of a crime without a jury trial or other
protections. See Custer, supra note 239, at 207–08 (discussing Justice Fortas’s majority opinion in In re Gault).
241
An Act For The Care and Education For Infants Who May Be Convicted Of Felony 1840, HC Bill
[532] cl. 1 (Eng.); see In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 942 (citing An Act For The Care and Education For
Infants Who May Be Convicted Of Felony at cl. 1). “As of 1850, an English minor could not be declared a ward
of the court—or be sent to a reform school or prison—on the basis of his commission of a felony unless he had
been afforded a right to trial by jury.” 159 Cal. App. 3d at 931.
242
In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 942.
243
See An Act For The Care and Education For Infants Who May Be Convicted Of Felony at cl. 1 (“In
every case in which any person being under the age of twenty-one years shall hereafter be convicted of felony,
it shall be lawful for her Majesty’s High Court of Chancery, upon the application of any person or persons who
may be willing to take charge of such infant, and to provide for his or her maintenance and education, if such
court find that the same will be for the benefit of such infant, due regard being had to the age of the infant, and
to the circumstances, habits, and character of the parents, testamentary or natural guardian, of such infant, to
assign the care and custody of such infant, during his or her minority, or any part thereof, to such person or
persons, upon such terms and conditions, and subject to such regulations as the said Court of Chancery shall
think proper to prescribe and direct ….”).
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conviction power: “[Before] this bill could come into operation, the civil rights
of the infant must be forfeited by a conviction ….”244
e. The Existence of Juvenile Courts
The final historical question is whether, in the late eighteenth century,
special English juvenile courts existed where juries did not try children. Such
courts did not exist, and Parliament rejected subsequent proposed legislation to
create them. A jury was the only decision-maker which could try any individual
accused of committing a serious crime, including a child.245
2. Juvenile Jury Rights in the United States
As described above, minors had a right to a jury trial in England in the late
eighteenth century. 246 The right to a jury trial of children in the United States in
the late eighteenth century must also be examined along with the right in the
mid-to-late nineteenth century. If juveniles in the United States did not have a
right to a jury trial at the time of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment or at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it might be argued that there
was no intention to grant them the right to a jury trial.
Youth held the right to a jury trial at both of these points in time in the states,
however. The constitutions of the original thirteen states and all of the
constitutions of the states that later joined the union guaranteed the right to a
jury trial.247 Youth who were prosecuted for crimes were treated in the same
manner as adults under these constitutions.248 This began to change in the late
nineteenth century. As the result of the reform movement described above, the
first juvenile court—without a jury trial—was established in 1899 in Chicago.249
Other jury-less juvenile courts spread quickly thereafter.250

244
55 Parl Deb HC (3rd ser.) (1840) col. 1258–60 (UK); see also Parliamentary Intelligence: House of
Commons, LONDON TIMES, Aug. 1, 1840, at 4 (“It had been attempted … to remove such children from the
influence of their parents, but it had been found impossible as the law at present stood …. [T]his was a new
principle, and one of a dangerous and peculiar character ….”).
245
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 255–76.
246
See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
247
See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 875 n.44 (1994); see also William C. Morey, The First State Constitutions, 4 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SO. SCI. 201, 231–32 (1893).
248
See JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 44, at 157.
249
See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
250
See JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 44, at 157.
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C. Petty Offenses by Comparison
Despite the Supreme Court’s recognition that history governs whether a right
to a jury trial exists, juveniles continue to be improperly denied the right to a
jury trial. By comparison, the Supreme Court’s analysis of petty offenses
demonstrates when an exception to the imposition of the right to a jury trial is
appropriate. At common law, many offenses were deemed “petty.“251 Juries did
not try these cases.252 Instead, judges or other officers tried them.253 Because of
this history, the Court has held that these petty offenses are not “crime[s]” under
the Sixth Amendment, and thus defendants accused of these offenses do not have
the right to a jury trial.254 Additionally, in circumstances where an offense was
petty at common law but the current severity of the penalty is comparable to that
of common law crimes, the Court has held that the accused is entitled to a jury
trial.255
How the Supreme Court has treated the analysis of the right to a jury trial
when a person is accused of committing a petty offense confirms that the right
to a jury trial for juveniles under the Sixth Amendment should be assessed
similarly—using history. As described above, no historical exception exists for
the availability of the jury trial for juveniles who are accused of crimes and
subject to significant detention.

III. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR JUVENILES UNDER THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
Outside of the Sixth Amendment, the right to a jury trial for youth could
derive from the Supreme Court’s holding that “the essentials of due process and
fair treatment” must be met in juvenile proceedings.256 The Court has already
stated that juveniles hold many rights under this requirement.257 These include
the right to counsel, right to notice of charges, right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right for
proof of a crime demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.258
251

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937).
Id.
253
Id. at 625–26.
254
Id. at 625–26; Stephen I. Vladeck, Petty Offenses and Article III, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 67, 74 (2015).
255
See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625. Because historically, jury trials were generally available for offenses
with a possible penalty of more than six months, defendants hold the right to a jury trial where the possible
penalty of an offense is more than six months. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 150 (1969).
256
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
257
Id. at 30–31.
258
Id. at 31–57.
252
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In McKeiver, the plurality limited the meaning of due process and fair
treatment when it decided juries were not necessary for fundamental fairness in
juvenile proceedings.259 It emphasized the competence of judges and their role
in other types of cases such as military and deportation cases.260 Also supported
by Justice White in his concurrence,261 it said that juries were not a “necessary
part of every criminal process that is fair and equitable” and “imposition of the
jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the
factfinding function.”262 The plurality and Justice White provided no support for
these statements that favored the authority of their fellow judges. Zawadi
Baharanyi and Randy Hertz pointed out that in the plurality opinion in
McKeiver, Justice Blackmun “relie[d] on unsubstantiated assertions” to assert
judges were as good as juries at factfinding.263
To the contrary, Blackstone described juries as necessary specifically
because of the possible bias of judges.264 Blackstone said the jury was “the grand
bulwark of [every Englishman’s] liberties.“265 The jury could check the power
of the King to appoint a biased judge who could sit in a case where the King
accused a subject.266 Blackstone even anticipated “new and arbitrary methods of
trial” such as “by justices of the peace” which “may appear at first” to be
“convenient.” Such methods were not sufficiently protective of an individual’s
“liberty” like the right to a jury trial.267 He also said if justice is entirely
“entrusted to the [magistry], a select body of men, and those generally selected
by the prince or such as enjoy[ing] the highest offices in the state, their decisions,
in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias
toward those of their own rank and dignity ….”268 Blackstone further stated:
“[I]n settling and [adjudicating] a question of fact, when [e]ntrusted to any single
magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample field to range in ….”269 On the
other hand, because “the law is well known” judges could be trusted to instruct
on the law, and “partiality [could] have little scope.”270

259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (plurality opinion).
Id.
See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
See Baharanyi & Hertz supra note 81, at 12.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note13, at 342–343.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343 (noting the “partiality of judges appointed by the crown”).
Id. at 343–44.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at 379.
Id. at 380.
Id.
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Thus, historically, because of that potential for bias, judges were not given
the power to decide whether adults or minors were guilty of crimes. Instead,
based on this history, the Constitution provided that “[t]he [t]rial of all [c]rimes,
except in [c]ases of [i]mpeachment, shall be by [j]ury,” and the Sixth
Amendment later provided more details on the right to a jury trial.271
Historically, and then set forth textually in the United States Constitution,
only a jury could decide whether a defendant committed a crime.272 With that
stated, some might believe that there are reasons not to follow the historical and
textual interpretation of the Constitution. For example, if judges do not now
possess bias toward the state or the possibility of corruption that motivated the
constitutional provision, then the constitutional provision need not be followed.
With that said, there is no reason to believe that circumstances have changed
substantially since the Constitution was adopted—that is, that judges are not
subject to bias and corruption. Baharanyi and Hertz have stated that even
Justices of the Supreme Court can be “blind … to distortions in the system and
manifest abuses in a particular case.”273 For example, they argued that a jury
would have acquitted on the facts in McKeiver and that judicial bias was evident
in In re Burrus, another one of the consolidated cases.274
The possibility of the corruption of judges and thus the problem with judges
as decision-makers are illustrated by the “Kids for Cash” scandal.275 The builder
of two private youth detention centers paid two judges to make delinquency
findings and impose significant detention time for juveniles.276 As the result of
their acceptance of bribery, the judges were convicted and sent to federal
prison.277 Their adjudications affected thousands of children; many were given
extended terms in youth centers for trivial offenses such as mocking school
officials on MySpace, writing prank notes, and shoplifting DVDs from WalMart.278 Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania subsequently investigated
cases handled by the judges and overturned adjudications of delinquency, many
271

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
In Patton v. United States, the Supreme Court decided a person could opt for a trial by judge. See 281
U.S. 276, 298 (1930).
273
Baharanyi & Hertz, supra note 81, at 12.
274
There were allegations of discrimination by the school system in that county in North Carolina. See id.
at 14–15.
275
See Ian Urbina, Despite Red Flags, Judges Ran Kickback Scheme for Years, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/us/28judges.html?_r=1.
276
See id.
277
See id.
278
See id.; see also Luzerne “Kids for Cash” Scandal, JUV. L. CTR., https://jlc.org/luzerne-kids-cashscandal (last visited June 8, 2018); Court Tosses Convictions of Corrupt Judge, CBS NEWS (Mar. 26, 2009 9:30
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/court-tosses-convictions-of-corrupt-judge/.
272
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juveniles were improperly detained or held for longer periods than was
warranted.279 Without juries, this type of corruption can occur and go unchecked.
The exchange of the freedom of children for cash is not the only form of
misconduct present in the juvenile justice system. For example, racism by judges
has been widely reported.280 Moreover, innocent minors can be detained.281
Although a jury could convict an innocent juvenile, the oversight of several
members of the community was historically considered better than a judge who
could be biased in favor of the government or those of his own rank or class, or
who could engage in corruption.
Modern studies show other types of possible bias. For example, information
bias can occur when judges learn of inadmissible evidence in stages prior to
factfinding.282 Judges often have such information available to them to make
decisions regarding whether or not a juvenile will be transferred to criminal court
and if he or she will be detained pending adjudication.283 This information can
include the defendant’s record.284 A judge will also rule on evidentiary matters
including pretrial motions to suppress evidence.285 Through these processes, the
judge can learn of otherwise inadmissible evidence.286 If the judge somehow
avoids becoming aware of this information during the pre-adjudication phase,
he or she may absorb such information from the review of the court file or
comments made by court staff in the judge’s presence.287 Both psychological
evidence and empirical studies show that people have difficulty disregarding

279
See Jon Schuppe, Pennsylvania Seeks to Close the Books on “Kids for Cash” Scandal, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 12, 2015, 4:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pennsylvania-seeks-close-books-kidscash-scandal-n408666; see Court Tosses Convictions of Corrupt Judge, CBS NEWS (Mar. 26, 2009 9:30 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/court-tosses-convictions-of-corrupt-judge/.
280
See Aldrich v. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 447 N.E.2d 1276, 1277 (N.Y. 1983) (per curiam)
(upholding removal of juvenile court judge from bench for using “profane, improper and menacing language”
and making “inappropriate racial references”); Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common Code:
Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 97, 131 (2011).
281
See, e.g., Drizin & Luloff, supra note 29, at 259.
282
See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the
Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 571–572 (1998).
283
Id.
284
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
285
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 282, at 571.
286
See id. at 572 n.68 (citing Commonwealth v. Goodman, 311 A.2d 652, 654 n.4 (Pa. 1973)) (concluding
that judge who presided over suppression hearing should have recused himself from bench trial in marijuana
possession case because hearsay testimony at suppression hearing gave “[a]n impression … that [accused was]
… trafficking in narcotics”).
287
See id. at 572 n.69 (citing In re James H., 341 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)); see also id. at
n.70 (citing In Re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127, 132 (Cal. 1970)).
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such relevant information,288 and judges are not immune from this problem.289
On the other hand, when juries find facts, judges can try to prevent them
from hearing inadmissible information by the use of rules of evidence and
procedure. The use of jury trials can also help lessen information bias because
groups of people—or juries in this case—are less susceptible to such biases than
a single person.290
In addition to the information bias of judges that is not present to the same
extent with jurors, judges have other additional biases. Repeat players come
before them such as prosecutors, and bias toward those individuals can occur.291
Additionally, bias toward the state by which they are employed can occur.292
Additionally, judges can be concerned about reelection or reappointment to their
positions.293 All of these factors can influence a judge to find against a child and
in favor of the state.
Jurors, unlike judges, are subject to a regular check on their potential bias by
outside parties. Voir dire of jurors helps eliminate bias as prospective jurors can
be excused for a variety of reasons including if they have had previous
experiences with a potential witness or parties to the case, if they have had too
much experience with the issue at hand, or if they believe that they cannot be
neutral.294 Unlike jurors, judges screen their own potential bias except in rare
cases when a party mounts a challenge to the neutrality of a judge.

288
See Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34 (1994); see
also Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological
Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pre-trial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence,
6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 678, 686 (2000) (summarizing studies finding juries were affected by ironic
processes).
289
MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 50 (1997) (“[T]he juryless court is a unitary tribunal:
the admissibility of evidence is decided here by the ultimate fact finder, who inevitably comes into contact with
tainted information. And when this information is persuasive, the professional judge has as much trouble
ignoring the acquired knowledge as do amateur adjudicators.”); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.431 (2004) (supporting the statement that judges are good at ignoring inadmissible
materials by stating they are “accustomed to reviewing matters that may not be admissible”); CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 41 (2d ed. 1994) (“[I]t is realistic to suppose that
judges can do better than juries in relying on what is admissible and ignoring what is not.”); see Andrew J.
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005).
290
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 282, at 575 (citations omitted).
291
See Prescott Loveland, Acknowledging and Protecting Against Judicial Bias at Fact-Finding in
Juvenile Court, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 295–96 (2017).
292
Id. at 298.
293
Id. at 295–96.
294
Anne R. Mahoney, American Jury Voir Dire and the Ideal of Equal Justice, 18 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI.
481, 483–86 (1982).
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Also unlike judges, jurors have explicit instructions on the law that govern
the case prior to deliberation.295 These instructions are scrutinized and subject to
appellate review.296 Without these instructions, which do not exist in juvenile
cases, when judges try minors, some commenters believe that “prejudicial errors
of law can easily go undetected because they are not articulated.”297
Another check on the bias of jurors is the requirement of a unanimous
decision. For the most part, a decision by the jury to convict must be
unanimous.298 Thus, six to twelve lay people must agree to convict an adult. This
procedure contrasts with the power of just one person—a judge—to convict a
minor.
Minors who are tried by judges also do not benefit from the power of juries
to decide not to convict and not to follow the law. Blackstone pointed out that
“juries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit
the guilty or mitigate the nature of the offense.”299 Judges, unlike juries, must
follow the law.
Children who are tried by judges also cannot benefit from the fact that juries
tend to acquit more often than judges. Judges’ higher conviction rate can be
attributed to a variety of factors, some of which have already been mentioned.
These include: the credibility of repeat players such as police and prosecutors
who appear before them; information bias; high caseloads of judges causing
them to pay less attention and lessen standards of proof; differences from
decision-making by an individual; lack of diversity; lack of inquiry into possible
bias; and the lack of legal instructions.300
Finally, a jury ensures that “a variety of different experiences, feelings,

295
See Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court
Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 942 (1995).
296
See id.
297
Id.; see Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other
Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 677 (2000) (concluding from empirical research that
limiting instructions are at best “relatively ineffective” and may actually backfire).
298
See SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 190 (2016).
299
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 19. Judges could historically recommend a pardon. “Judges, through
compassion, will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal mercy.” Id. An example may
be a recent case where a jury did not convict a child accused of stealing a gun from a retired judge. Edith BradyLundy, In Rare Jury Trial, Bloomington Juvenile Acquitted of Gun Charges, PANTAGRAPH (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.pantagraph.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/in-rare-jury-trial-bloomington-juvenile-acquittedof-gun-charges/article_7db05bc1-d247-5e8a-b65e-ed1acf7ab80e.html.
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See Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 1122–26.
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intuitions, and habits” play a role in factfinding.301 Additionally, jury
deliberations also offer “the give-and-take of a discussion format [that] promotes
accuracy and good judgment by ensuring that competing viewpoints are aired
and vetted.”302 This all increases the likelihood that witness credibility and
factual accuracy will be better assessed.303
In each of the Court’s decisions on juveniles, the Court was careful to
describe how the required procedure protected minors and thus, was part of “the
essentials of due process and fair treatment.”304 In McKeiver, in its assessment
of whether the right to a jury trial was required for fundamental fairness, the
plurality fell short. The core of fairness in any criminal proceeding, including in
a juvenile court, is the person who actually makes the decisions regarding guilt.
Without empirical support and with historical support to the contrary, the Court
proclaimed that judges were just as good at decision-making as juries.
Add to this that judges themselves often are not involved in the primary
decision on whether a juvenile loses his liberty. Instead, plea bargaining often
occurs, and prosecutors hold almost exclusive power here. In these
circumstances where prosecutors who represent the state possess charge or
sentencing bargaining authority that can be used to incentivize a juvenile to
plead guilty, the right to a jury trial is also a necessary component for
fundamental fairness. With the right, juveniles hold some bargaining power
against the prosecutor to actually contest the charges against them; to the
contrary, a prosecutor likely does not see the trial by judge as a chip stacked in
the juvenile’s favor. Moreover, the prosecutor also may recognize that a judge
can punish a juvenile for not taking a plea.
In the decision that the right to a jury trial was not required as a part of
fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the Court relied heavily on
the idea that judges were as good at factfinding as juries. It also listed several
reasons that bear mentioning. The Court cited the actions of groups, states, and
judges. First, it mentioned that the national task force that studied juvenile
proceedings did not recommend a jury trial, and that various organizations,
including the one for uniform laws, had not recommended a right to a jury trial.
What various groups have said about the right to a jury trial does not substantiate
that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial. Second, the Court explained

301
302
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Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 282, at 575–76 (citations omitted).
Id. at 578–79.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 156–57 (1968); see Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 282, at 576–

82.
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In re Gault, 387 U.S.1, 31–58 (1967).
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that states could implement different procedures in their juvenile courts
including jury trials, that many states had denied a juvenile jury right by statute,
and that many states had concluded that jury trials were not required
constitutionally. Again, the decision of states regarding the right to a jury trial
has no bearing on whether a right to a jury trial exists under the Constitution.
Finally, the Court mentioned that a judge could use an advisory jury.305 Again,
the availability of an advisory jury to a judge does not eliminate the
constitutional right to a jury trial for a minor.
The Sixth Amendment sets forth several rights that the Court has already
recognized as necessary to fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings,
including the right to counsel, right to notice of charges, right to confront
witnesses, and the right to compulsory process. The right to a jury trial is the
only right in the Sixth Amendment that the Court has said is not fundamental to
due process and fair treatment for minors. But the importance of the jury trial
was especially emphasized by its inclusion in the original Constitution, in
contrast to the other protections for youth that the Court has recognized.
Indeed, the trial by jury has been historically recognized as one of the most
important, if not the most important, right. As William Nelson has recognized,
“[f]or Americans, after the Revolution, as well as before, the right to a trial by
jury was probably the most valued of all civil rights.”306 Although the Court has
held that the right to a jury trial is not part of the fundamental fairness required
in a juvenile proceeding, the right to a jury trial was integral to the historic
protection provided to an accused, and accordingly this protection should be
provided to juveniles as a part of the essentials of due process and fair treatment
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

IV. CRITICISMS OF IMPLEMENTING THE JURY TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT
Some opponents of implementing jury trials in juvenile court may believe it
will be inefficient, increase costs, and undermine the rehabilitative features of
the juvenile justice system. In McKeiver, the Court specifically wrote that
305
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528, 545–551 (1971) (plurality opinion). The Court concluded:
“If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system,
there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the
moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.” Id. at 551. Concurring in the judgment, Justice White began
by proclaiming “[a]lthough the function of the jury is to find facts, that body is not necessarily or even probably
better than the conscientious judge.” Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring). Some years later, in 1984, the decision
in Schall v. Martin followed. There, the Supreme Court held it was constitutional to detain a juvenile before trial
on the basis that he may commit an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. See 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
306
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 96 (1975).
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imposing the jury trial on juvenile courts would bring with it “the traditional
delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system.”307
A. Efficiency and Cost
The addition of jury trials to a state juvenile justice system could decrease
any efficiency that may be present in the juvenile courts. For example, a felony
jury trial can take between two and four days on average.308 In contrast, bench
trials typically last a single day.309 In McKeiver, in dissent, Justice Douglas
disagreed with the plurality that jury trials would be inefficient.310 He cited a
decision from the family court of Providence, Rhode Island, rejecting the idea
of an inevitable decrease in efficiency.311 This court found “that there is no
meaningful evidence that granting the right to jury trials will impair the function
of the court” given that “few juries have been demanded” in the states that permit
jury trials in their juvenile courts.312 More recently, in Kansas, few jury trials
have occurred after the Kansas Supreme Court decided the right to a jury trial
was constitutionally required.313
The continued use of jury trials in juvenile courts in roughly twenty-five
percent of the states is also evidence of the viability of jury trials in states.314
One can infer that the jury trial operates reasonably well because the jury trial
right is conferred by statute in some states, and state legislatures could do away
with it if the right caused problems.
Related to efficiency is cost. The addition of jury trials may require new
facilities. For instance, after the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in In re L.M.,
the most populous county in Kansas realized it had only one juvenile courtroom
capable of presiding over a jury trial.315 The second most populous county did
not even have juvenile justice facilities able to house jurors.316 In addition to the
costs of additional facilities, juries require many expenses not associated with
307

McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
See Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 60 (1999).
309
DALE ANNE SIPES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL TRIALS 14–15 (1988).
310
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 562 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
311
Id.
312
Id. at 564.
313
See James Carlson, Juvenile Jury Trials Remain Rare, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL (May 16, 2010, 2:42
PM), http://www.cjonline.com/news/local/2010-05-16/juvenile_jury_trials_remain_rare.
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See HERTZ, supra note 3, at 416–17.
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See Andrew Treaster, Juveniles in Kansas Have a Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial. Now What?
Making Sense of In re L.M., 57 KAN. L. REV. 1275, 1293–94 (2009).
316
See id.
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bench trials, including: preparing and updating juror lists and instructions, juror
fees, administrators’ salaries, jury summoning mailers, juror meals, and
potential costs of sequestering a jury during deliberations.317
At the same time that trials can add to costs, the detention of juveniles is
already a significant cost that could be reduced if juveniles were not detained as
often.318 Although juries often find in the same way as judges, they tend to
convict less often.319
With that said, as recognized already, jury trials could be less efficient and
more costly. But the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally required to be
efficient or costless. While efficiency and decreasing costs should be goals given
limited resources, those considerations do not affect their constitutional
viability.
There actually could be good results that derive from inefficiency. The
Rhode Island court pointed out that if the jury trial in juvenile court lead to
delays, this could be beneficial: “[B]y granting the juvenile the right to a jury
trial, we would, in fact, be protecting the accused from the judge who is under
pressure to move the cases, the judge with too many cases and not enough
time.”320
B. Keeping Rehabilitative Features
Opponents of jury trials for juveniles commonly assume that the
implementation of jury trials will undermine any rehabilitative features of
juvenile court. In McKeiver, the Court emphasized this point, even going so far
as to state that “if the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be
superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate
existence.”321 Simply implementing jury trials, however, does not undermine
rehabilitative goals or require the abolishment of juvenile justice systems.322
While any intimate bench trial that may occur could disappear with the
introduction of the jury trial,323 other rehabilitative features such as diversion
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See id. (citing Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 60

(1999)).
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See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 38, at 187–90.
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58 tbl.12 (1966).
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McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528, 565 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (decision in appendix).
321
Id. at 545–51.
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See Feld, supra note 9, at 88.
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As previously discussed, few bench trials actually occur. Instead, plea bargaining is prevalent. See
supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text.
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programs, early involvement of probation officers and families, access to social
service agencies, and sentencing alternatives that are less punitive than jail will
remain.324 These features will be accompanied by protection from the bias and
the incentives of judicial decision-making—which ultimately can result in a
more just juvenile justice system.
Despite the Supreme Court’s assertions about the jury trial preventing
rehabilitation, in certain nations, the goal of rehabilitation continues where lay
people participate. For example, in France, a juvenile court consists of a single
juvenile judge and two non-professional judges (e.g., experts in juvenile
delinquency and the field of childhood).325 In Germany, three-member juvenile
panels include a man and a woman who serve as “lay assessors,” who are
selected and appointed to German youth courts by local authorities.326
However, similar to most states in the United States, a majority of
international jurisdictions try juveniles only by judges. A single judge or panels
with multiple judges act as triers of fact.327 Despite this similarity with most
nations that judges are the fact-finders in juvenile cases, the United States differs
from all of these jurisdictions because the Constitution conveys a broad right to
jury trial in criminal cases.328
With all of this stated including that jury trials could bring harm to
juveniles,329 youth have a constitutional right to a jury trial. Even if the
imposition of this right could somehow lead to injury to minors, it is a
constitutional right that cannot be taken away without amendment.330
324

Loveland, supra note 293, at 308 (citing DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND
436, 479, 506 (3rd ed. 2007)).
325
See Children’s Rights: France, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/child-rights/france.
php (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
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THOMAS, supra note 298, at 202–05.
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See Children’s Rights: International and National Laws and Practices, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.
loc.gov/law/help/child-rights/index.php#Country%20Reports (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). See generally
FRANKLIN ZIMRING ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Franklin Zimring et al. eds., 2015)
(describing several juvenile systems).
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See generally THOMAS, supra note 298.
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See also Feld, supra note 65, at 1159–61 (arguing that jury trials could bring harm to juveniles); Irene
M. Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WISC. L. REV.
163; Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 1122–23 (arguing for abolition of juvenile courts and for importance of jury
trial right).
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Also, states are free to give minors further protections including separate prosecution in special juvenile
courts. Innovation may work. In fact, there have been successful teen courts where groups of teens have tried
fellow children and are involved in the rehabilitative process. Teens who have completed the teen court process
are less likely to commit other crimes. See Stephanie N. Lehman, Teens, Judges Who Have Been through Teen
Court Say it Works, LAKE COUNTY J., (2010). Another result has been a 50% reduction in the teens detained in
the Juvenile Detention Center. See Elvia Malagon, Justice for Teens, By Teens in Lake County, NWI TIMES
THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
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CONCLUSION
As described in this Article, contrary to the Supreme Court’s unsupported
assertions, juvenile proceedings fall within the meaning of criminal prosecutions
under the Sixth Amendment. Further, the good purpose of the state to rehabilitate
cannot preclude coverage under the Sixth Amendment. Because the Sixth
Amendment guarantees defendants the right to “a trial by jury as understood and
applied at common law,”331 and historically youth were afforded the right to a
trial by jury, juveniles possess this right. This conclusion is also supported by
English legal commentary, cases, and secondary sources in the period
surrounding the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, nineteenth
century English legislation to take away the right to a jury trial for juveniles
confirms youth possessed the right in the eighteenth century. Moreover, contrary
to Supreme Court assertions, the eighteenth-century concept of parens patriae
does not support the power of the state to try a juvenile by a judge. Finally,
juveniles in the United States possessed the right to a jury trial at the time when
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted.
In addition to a right under the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendments, juveniles have a right under the Due Process Clause via the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. History and modern studies show as untrue the
Supreme Court’s assertion that the jury trial right is not necessary to fundamental
fairness to juveniles. Judges are not equally as good at decision-making as juries.
Juries were chosen because judges could have bias against the defendant and
could engage in corruption—all of which can occur today.

(May 15, 2016), https://www.nwitimes.com/news/education/justice-for-teens-by-teens-in-lake-county/article_
d7589921-3bfc-5cc7-a340-58aa162c5c73.html.
331
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).

